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WHEN THE PRICE IS TOO HIGH: RETHINKING 
CHINA’S DETERRENCE STRATEGY FOR ROBBERY 
Peter D. Nestor† 
Abstract: Economic property crime in China has soared since the country enacted 
market reforms in the early 1980s.  Robbery rates are rising faster than most economic 
property crimes, such as larceny and fraud, and violent crimes, such as rape, murder, and 
assault.  China’s strategy for deterrence is to raise the “price” of the crime by increasing 
the severity of the penalty.  Since 1979, China’s criminal law has permitted the use of the 
death penalty for robbers in nearly all cases, and courts have applied it regularly and in 
many different types of robbery cases.  Since 1983, China has formally engaged in 
“strike-hard” campaigns, in which the government dedicates massive law enforcement 
resources to fight a particular crime.  The campaigns have targeted robbery and have 
resulted in mass arrests, swift trials, and severe sentences—including mass executions.   
Despite these efforts, China has failed to deter individuals from committing more 
robberies.  This Comment argues that China should reform its deterrence strategy by 
revising its criminal law and “strike-hard” campaigns.  China should adopt new 
deterrence strategies that combine law with sociology, economics, and psychology.  Not 
only will these strategies deter more robbery, they will also deter the more serious crimes 
often committed during robberies.  The new strategies will also provide incentives for 
individuals to commit less violent crime. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1980s, China’s strategy to deter rising crime has been 
to impose severe punishment, including the death penalty, on crimes that do 
not necessarily result in the victim’s death.1  The theory, captured in the 
traditional Chinese saying, “kill the chicken and let the monkey watch,” is 
that severe penalties will effectively deter individuals from committing a 
particular crime.2  Accordingly, nearly all forms of robbery are punishable 
by death under the codified criminal statutes.3 
China’s deterrence strategy, however, has been ineffective over the 
last twenty-five years.  China’s official statistics are often incomplete and 
                                           
†
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  HAROLD M. TANNER, STRIKE HARD! ANTI-CRIME CAMPAIGNS AND CHINESE CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
1979-1985 139, 141 (1999); RONALD C. KEITH & ZHIQIU LIN, NEW CRIME IN CHINA 108 (2006); BORGE 
BAKKEN, THE EXEMPLARY SOCIETY 396 (2000). 
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unreliable,4 but even official statistics show that China’s crime rate, 
including the rate of robberies, has risen dramatically since the early 1980s.5  
The Ministry of Public Security reports that crime nearly quadrupled in 
twenty years, rising from eighty crimes per 100,000 people in 1981 to 
approximately 360 per 100,000 people in 2001.6  Economic property crimes 
accounted for the greatest single increase in crime between 1981 and 1990, 
and continued to rise faster than most violent crimes through the 1990s.7  
Robbery increased nearly sixteen times in twenty years, from 22,266 
reported cases in 1981 to 352,216 in 2001, faster than theft, fraud, homicide, 
rape, and assault.8 
Confronted with this dramatic increase in robbery, the government 
made concerted efforts to reduce robbery and other violent crimes.9  China’s 
two-pronged deterrence strategy authorized the death penalty for robbery 
through its Criminal Law, and initiated “strike-hard” campaigns intended to 
deter crime through a broad show of force.  China has authorized the death 
penalty for robbery since first codifying its Criminal Law in 1979.10  In 
                                           
4
  Jianhong Liu, Crime Patterns During the Market Transition in China, 45 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 
613, 621-22 (2005).  Liu identifies several problems with relying on official statistics in China, including 
the changing definitions of crime, under- and over-reporting, and that the rate of reporting for economically 
motivated crimes increased during the transition to a market economy.  See also TANNER, supra note 1, at 
106 (noting under- and over-reporting of cases in the China Law Yearbook in an attempt to “prove” that 
government had reduced crime). 
5
  See TANNER, supra note 1, at 107 (noting an “overall increase in crime” during the 1980s and 
1990s based on statistics for cases published by the public security organs); LI ZHANG, STRANGERS IN THE 
CITY 140 (2001) (noting the general increase in urban crime); Borge Bakken, Comparative Perspectives on 
Crime in China, in CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND POLICING IN CHINA 64-65 (Borge Bakken ed., 2005). 
6
  BAKKEN, supra note 5, at 64-65. 
7
  TANNER, supra note 1, at 107. 
8
  BAKKEN, supra note 5, at 64-66.  See also Liu, supra note 4, at 624-26.  Between 1978 and 1999, 
the crime rate for larceny, grand larceny, fraud and robbery all increased faster than homicide, rape, and 
assault.  Grand larceny (defined as theft worth more than approximately $365) increased the fastest at 9,042 
percent; robbery increased 2,722 percent; and larceny (adjusted for the change of the definition of larceny 
in 1992 by the Chinese government, which led to a lower post-1992 larceny rate).  Less or non-
economically motivated crimes increased at a slower rate, generally: homicide increased 253 percent; rape 
increased 131 percent; and assault increased 491 percent.  While these percentage increases seem shocking, 
it is important to remember that, although crime is rising quickly, China’s crime rates are still relatively low 
compared to other countries.   
9
  Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Work Report, 2001 http://www.spp.gov.cn/site2006/2006-02-
22/00018-292.html [hereinafter 2001 Work Report]; Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Work Report, 2004  
http://www.spp.gov.cn/site2006/2006-02-22/00018-295.html [hereinafter 2004 Work Report] (both reports 
emphasizing the government’s focus on reducing violent crime, specifically robbery).  See also Chinese 
Police Dealt With Over 4.65 Million Criminal Cases Last Year, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Sept. 27, 
2006, at 1, available at DIALOG, File No. 985 (quoting senior government officials: “Criminal cases have 
become more violent, organized and professional.  Serious crimes such as murder, robbery, kidnapping, 
arson, and car theft have been causing serious harm to society.”). 
10
  Xing shi fa [Criminal Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 
1979, effective Jan. 1, 1980) [hereinafter 1979 Criminal Law], art. 150, http://www.novexcn.com/ 
criminal_law.html.  See discussion infra Part II.A.  
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1983, the government enacted its first strike-hard campaign.11  The 
campaigns target a particular crime, such as robbery, and ramp up law 
enforcement and state propaganda machines to obtain mass arrests, swift 
trials, and mass executions.12  But over the long run, the death penalty and 
the strike-hard campaigns have failed to deter robbery.13 
This Comment argues that China should reform its deterrence strategy 
by revising its Criminal Law and strike-hard campaigns to incorporate 
interdisciplinary deterrence strategies that combine law, economics, 
sociology, and psychology.  The oversimplified notion that a more severe 
penalty will deter crime has lost traction to novel developments in deterrence 
theory.14  Because China’s Criminal Law has developed new legal hooks on 
which to hang arguments for reform,15 China is in a good position to adopt 
several new deterrence strategies to deter robbery more effectively. 
Part II of this Comment examines how China attempts to deter 
robbery through its Criminal Law.  Part III discusses how China’s strike-
hard campaigns fail to deter robbery.  Part IV argues that China should 
improve deterrence by reforming the strike-hard campaigns and by 
discontinuing the death penalty for robbery.  The conclusion points out that 
criminal law reform faces significant but surmountable barriers if reforms 
are couched in gradual and pragmatic terms.16 
II. SEVERE PENALTIES IN CHINA’S CRIMINAL LAW ARE AN INEFFECTIVE 
DETERRENT FOR ROBBERY 
The 1997 Criminal Law clarified when courts may impose the death 
penalty for robbery, but retained its use for almost all types of robbery.  
While public support for the death penalty remains high, legislators and 
scholars have called for a reduced reliance on it as a deterrent measure.  This 
is consistent with important rhetorical additions to the 1997 Criminal Law, 
                                           
11
  See discussion infra Part III. 
12
  Id. 
13
  Bakken, supra note 5, at 65.  Senior government officials stated that robbery and theft cases 
accounted for eighty percent of total criminal cases in 2005.  Criminal Cases Up 4.6 Percent in 2005 Year-
on-Year, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Jan. 19, 2006, at 1, available at DIALOG, File No. 985.  Officials 
also reported that economic property crimes increased 1.6 percent from 2005 to 2006, with robbery rising 
4.9 percent.  PRC Sees Decline of Violent Crimes, Rise of Property Infringement in 1st Quarter, WORLD 
NEWS CONNECTION, Apr. 11, 2006, at 1, available at DIALOG, File No. 985. 
14
  Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The New Path of Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. 
REV. 2477, 2477 (1997). 
15
  See discussion infra Part II.C. 
16
  Randall Peerenboom, Law and Development of Constitutional Democracy in China: Problem or 
Paradigm?  19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 185, 229 (2005) (noting that successful legal reforms in China are 
generally gradual and grounded in pragmatism). 
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including the provision that punishment should fit the crime.17  With rising 
crime rates, lawmakers should continue to question the efficacy of severe 
punishment as a deterrent measure and use provisions in the Criminal Law 
as a guidepost for reform. 
A. Courts Impose the Death Penalty for Nearly All Types of Robbery 
China codified its Criminal Law in 1979 after rewriting draft 
legislation thirty-three times since 1951.18  From 1979 to 1997, the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC), a quasi-legislative 
organ, amended the law twenty-four times.19  After lively scholarly debate, 
China substantially rewrote its Criminal Law for the first time in 1997 and 
incorporated many of the revisions passed in the interim.20   
Since 1979, Chinese society has been transformed from an insular 
socialist regime to an international market economy and, as a result, has 
undergone tremendous economic, social, and political change.21  In response 
to these changes, the 1997 Criminal Law codified 100 new crimes and 
incorporated 220 offenses that were created or amended pursuant to 
legislation passed between 1979 and 1997.22  The codification of many new 
crimes, including securities fraud, intellectual property crimes, tax fraud, and 
land-use sale or transfer crimes, reflects China’s economic and social 
development.23  The new crimes indicated the government’s willingness to 
respond to social change by creating legal provisions to fill gaps in the law.24  
In addition, the lack of uniformity and ambiguity in many of the 1979 
provisions created problems in applying the law fairly and accurately.25  The 
1997 Criminal Law thus addressed these deficiencies and formulated a more 
complete criminal code.26  
The effect of lack of uniformity and ambiguity in the 1979 provisions 
can be seen in the context of robbery.  The 1979 Criminal Law's definition of 
                                           
17
  1997 Criminal Law, supra note 3, art. 5. 
18
  ALBERT HUNG-YEE CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA 233-34 (3d ed. 2004). 
19
  WEI LUO, THE 1997 CRIMINAL CODE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: WITH ENGLISH 
TRANSLATION AND INTRODUCTION 5 (1998) (noting that the National People’s Congress interim laws and 
regulations could not be codified in 1979 because China lacked a system whereby new legislative laws 
could be codified in the corresponding statutory section).   
20
  CHEN, supra note 18, at 236 (noting that the 1997 revision was the “most significant development 
in Chinese criminal law since 1979”).   
21
  KEITH & LIN, supra note 1, at 142.  
22
  CHEN, supra note 18. 
23
  LUO, supra note 19, at 5-6, 16. 
24
  Id. 
25
  Id.; KEITH & LIN, supra note 1, at 142. 
26
  LUO, supra note 19, at 5-6. 
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robbery is vague, and it is unclear when courts may impose the death penalty 
on offenders.  The 1979 Criminal Law states that “[w]hoever takes public or 
private property by force, threat or other methods” is subject to three to ten 
years’ imprisonment.27  However, if the “circumstances of the crime” are 
“serious” or “grievous bodily injury or death has been caused,” the offender 
is subject to a sentence of at least “ten years’ [imprisonment], life 
imprisonment or death.”28  The law does not define “serious” or “grievous 
bodily injury.” 
Because of the problems in applying this vague provision, the 1997 
Law attempted to clarify “serious” and “grievous bodily injury” by listing 
eight provisions authorizing the death penalty for certain types of robbery.29 
However, a closer examination reveals that the eight provisions of 1997 Law 
are equally vague and nearly as broad.  A review of several cases below 
shows that China uses the death penalty extensively for robberies.  The cases 
also shed light on how the Criminal Law fails to deter criminals from 
committing crimes more serious than robbery during the commission of 
robbery.30  The government does not publicize all cases involving the death 
penalty, particularly those involving criminals who have committed 
relatively petty crimes.31 
1. The Robbery Provisions are Vague and Give Courts Broad Discretion 
to Impose the Death Penalty 
The basic elements of robbery in the 1997 Criminal Law are larceny 
(theft) combined with the use of violence or coercion.32  As in the 1979 
Criminal Law, basic robbery is subject to three to ten years' imprisonment.33  
Attempting to clarify “serious or grievous injury,” the 1997 Law listed eight 
provisions under which robbery is subject to at least ten years’ 
imprisonment, life imprisonment, or death.34  A closer look at the eight 
                                           
27
  1979 Criminal Law, supra note 10. 
28
  Id.  
29
  See 1997 Criminal Law, supra note 3, art. 263(1)–(8). 
30
  See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
31
  Virgin K.Y. Ho, What is Wrong with Capital Punishment? Official and Unofficial Attitudes 
Toward Capital Punishment in Modern and Contemporary China, in THE CULTURAL LIVES OF CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 274, 279 (Austin Sarat & Christian Boulanger eds., 2005).  
Consequently, these cases are by no means exhaustive or representative of a statistical proportion of cases 
where the death penalty was applied.  Rather, they are illustrative of how the criminal law is applied and of 
the criminal law’s deficiencies. 
32
  1997 Criminal Law, supra note 3, art. 263. 
33
  Id. 
34
  Id. art. 263(1)–(8). 
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provisions under Article 263 governing robbery shows that nearly all forms 
of robbery are still punishable by death.35  
The first, second, and third provisions under Article 263 cover all 
burglaries, 36 robberies committed on public transportation,37 and bank 
robberies.38  The fourth provision states that “multiple robberies” and 
robberies involving “large sums of money” are punishable by death.39  In 
2005, the Supreme People’s Court clarified that “multiple robberies” means 
three separate robberies that involve different locations, intentions, and 
times.40  This is a similar policy to the “three strikes and you’re out” 
criminal law policy adopted in some jurisdictions in the United States.41  The 
difference is that an individual who commits robbery three times in China 
may be subject to the death penalty.42   
Courts interpret “large sums of money” loosely.  One striking example 
from 2004 involved two robbers targeting taxi drivers.43  They stole 
approximately seventy dollars and a cell phone from a taxi driver, then 
placed the driver in the trunk of the car and escaped.  One month later, they 
took approximately four dollars and a cell phone from another taxi driver, 
then threw her in a nearby river.  Neither taxi driver died, yet the court 
sentenced both robbers to death for stealing a total of seventy-four dollars 
and two cell phones. 
The fifth provision adopts the vague 1979 provision regarding 
“serious” injury, and makes robbery punishable by death when the robbery 
involves “serious injury or death to another person” in the course of 
committing a robbery.44  Again, the 1997 Criminal Law does not define 
“serious injury,” and courts have applied a broad interpretation.  In 2006, 
officials in Henan Province executed four men for stealing hundreds of tons 
of crude oil by drilling holes in pipelines, even though no one was injured in 
                                           
35
  China does not make all criminal cases publicly available or publish official statistics on the types 
of crimes or cases that receive the death penalty.  See Ho supra note 31. 
36
  1997 Criminal Law, supra note 3, art. 263(1). 
37
  Id. art. 263(2). 
38
  Id. art. 263(3). 
39
  Id. art. 263(4). 
40
  Opinion on Robbery and Forcible Seizure, (Supreme People’s Court, June 8, 2005), 
http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show1.php?file_id=107473. 
41
  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (1994). 
42
  1997 Criminal Law, supra note 3, art. 263(4). 
43
  Yongsheng Zhang, Nan zi qiangjie chuzu che jiang nu si ji kunbang hou touru Huang He [Men 
Rob Female Taxi Driver and Throw Her Into the Yellow River], LANZHOU MORNING POST, Apr. 12, 2006, 
http://news.sina.com.cn/s/2006-04-15/23599629147.shtml.  
44
  1997 Criminal Law, supra note 3, art. 263(5). 
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the process.45  In 1996, the Henan provincial court sentenced the leader of a 
criminal gang to death after his gang was found guilty of committing 
eighteen counts of burglary worth more than six thousand dollars where 
there was no indication that anyone was injured.46  
2. Robbery-Murder Cases Demonstrate the Flawed Penalty Structure 
Robbery-murder is a felony-murder in which the commission of a 
robbery results in death.47  Typical robbery-murder cases involve situations 
where robbery was the intended crime and murder was committed to 
improve the chance of escape by killing witnesses.  For example, in 2005, 
criminals in Chongqing involved in a robbery were sentenced to death for 
stealing goods and then killing witnesses to the robbery.48  In 2006, four 
unemployed migrant workers were executed for robbing a van driver and 
later killing him.49  The two criminals additionally kidnapped two college 
students and extorted approximately $8750 from their relatives.  In 2005, on 
the same day, a court in Fujian sentenced to death a man who robbed and 
later killed a prostitute, and a prostitute who robbed and later killed a 
customer.50  The two criminals were executed shortly before National Day in 
October 2005.51   
One particular robbery-murder case in 2005 clearly connects the legal 
implications of robbery, murder, and the flawed penalty structure. 52  Three 
unemployed men in eastern Jiangxi Province decided to rob their neighbor’s 
house.  One of the men, Liao Hui, suggested killing anyone in the house 
after the robbery.  His two accomplices disagreed, saying that they were 
afraid to murder people, but agreed to go ahead with the robbery.  The 
robbery occurred two days later, and the three obtained approximately $5084 
from the neighbor.  During the robbery, the female owner of the house and 
                                           
45
  Four Executed for Stealing Oil from Pipelines in China, GERMAN PRESS AGENCY, Oct. 26, 2006, 
http://rawstory.com/news/2006/Four_executed_for_stealing_oil_from_102622006.html. 
46
  Henan Court Sentences Criminals to Death, Imprisonment, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Dec. 6, 
1996, at 1, available at DIALOG, File No. 985. 
47
  JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 556 (LexisNexis, 4th ed. 2006). 
48
  Robbers Kill Two, Injure One in China’s Chongqing Municipality, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, 
May 16, 2005, at 1-2, available at DIALOG, File No. 985 
49
  China Executes Four for Killing, Kidnapping, Robbery, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, June 9, 
2006, at 1, available at DIALOG, File No. 985 
50
  Man Who Impersonated Official Among 26 Executed in PRC Ahead of National Day, WORLD 
NEWS CONNECTION, September 29, 2005, at 1-2, available at DIALOG, File No. 985. 
51
  See discussion infra note 132 (noting that executions tend to increase around national holidays). 
52
  Jun Xie, 3 Wuye nan 67 dao jiesha lingju muzi san ren, yishen beipan sixing [Three Unemployed 
Men Kill Neighbors, a Woman and Her Son, By Stabbing Them Sixty-Seven Times], JIANGNAN CITY 
NEWSPAPER, Oct. 10, 2006 available at http://news.eastday.com/eastday/node79841/node79860/ 
node165110/ u1a2368104.html. 
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her two sons confronted the three intruders.  Liao Hui killed the woman and 
insisted that his accomplices kill the sons, but they refused.  Liao Hui then 
killed both of the sons.  The court sentenced all three individuals to death.  
This case demonstrates the Criminal Law's flawed penalty structure 
for two reasons.  First, the two men who intended to commit the less harmful 
crime, robbery, gained no benefit from their restraint because the current 
penalty scheme punishes robbery and murder with death.  The men would 
have had a much stronger argument not to commit murder if only murder, 
not robbery, was punishable by death.  Second, the man who committed 
murder had incentive to hedge his bets against vague provisions for robbery.  
If an individual cannot reasonably predict the punishment for a crime, the 
current law provides an incentive to err on the side of caution, which for the 
criminal means killing any potential witnesses and thus causing more harm 
to society. 
3. Attenuated Connections to Robbery Are also Punishable by Death but 
Are an Ineffective Deterrent  
The sixth, seventh, and eighth provisions of Article 263 make robbery 
punishable by death where the offender impersonated a police officer or 
serviceman,53 committed robbery with a gun,54 or committed robbery of 
materials used for emergency rescue or disaster relief.55  In 2000, seven 
members of a gang were executed in the southern city of Kunming for 
impersonating military personnel, robbing, and then killing the victims.56  
On the use of guns, cases confirm that courts will impose the death penalty 
for the corollary activity of selling or providing guns to robbers.  In 1997, 
several unemployed migrants in Beijing were sentenced to death after 
providing guns that were later used by third parties in armed bank robbery.57  
                                           
53
  1997 Criminal Law, supra note 3, art. 263(6). 
54
  Id. art. 263(7). 
55
  Id. art. 263(8). 
56
  Kunming Holds Public Execution of Seven Killers, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Nov. 17, 2000, at 
1, available at DIALOG, File No. 985 (20,000 Kunming residents attended their public trial, evidence of 
the high public support for the death penalty).  Recent campaigns have targeted criminal gang activity.  In 
2004, eight members of a criminal gang in Wenzhou were executed after a crime spree in which they stole 
approximately $2415 and snatched mobile phones and valuables from at least 120 people.  Some of the 
victims were killed.  Eight Members of Crime Gang Executed in Eastern China, WORLD NEWS 
CONNECTION, Aug. 23, 2004, at 1, available at DIALOG, File No. 985.  
57
  Three Executed in Beijing, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Mar. 25, 1997, at 1, available at 
DIALOG, File No. 985. 
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In 2006, a peasant from Guangxi was punished for making and selling guns 
out of his home.58 
Imposing the death penalty for corollary crimes of owning and 
producing guns may be an attempt to curb violent crime.  Over the last 
several years, the government has targeted violent crime as the focus of 
police resources and strike-hard campaigns.59  The current criminal law is 
vague enough that these corollary crimes may be punished by death under 
the provisions for robbery or in a catch-all sweep during a strike-hard 
campaign.60  But based on the rising robbery rates, it is far from certain that 
punishing corollary crimes to robbery will deter those who actually commit 
the robberies. 
4. The 1997 Criminal Law Further Increased the Severity of Robbery’s 
Penalty by Abolishing Parole 
The 1997 Criminal Law raised the price of committing robbery, 
hoping to improve deterrence by tightening parole provisions.61  Under the 
1979 Criminal Law, all criminals on fixed term imprisonment were eligible 
for parole once they served more than half of their original sentence and 
showed “true repentance” for their crime.62  The 1997 Criminal Law 
modified this provision by prohibiting parole for criminals sentenced to 
more than ten years for violent crimes, and specifically listed robbery as a 
violent offense.63  
These parole reforms track similar views held toward plea-bargaining 
in criminal systems such as in the United States.64  Some Chinese scholars 
posit that “plea-bargaining distorts the correct relationship between social 
harm and criminal liability” by letting the defendant receive lesser 
punishment for a crime.65  In short, once an offender commits a robbery, the 
chances of being imprisoned and staying in prison for the full term are high, 
which further increases the price of committing the crime. 
The 1997 revisions removed the 1979 provision permitting the death 
sentence where the “circumstances of the crime” are serious.  However, 
                                           
58
  Roundup Report of Crime and Punishment monitored in PRC 15 May - 05 Jun 06, WORLD NEWS 
CONNECTION, June 14, 2006, at 4, available at DIALOG, File No. 985. 
59
  2004 Work Report, supra note 9 (emphasizing the use of strike-hard campaigns and the focus on 
curbing violent crime).  
60
  1997 Criminal Law, supra note 3.  See also discussion infra Part III. 
61
  2001 Work Report, supra note 9; 2004 Work Report, supra note 9. 
62
  1979 Criminal Law, supra note 10, art. 73. 
63
  1997 Criminal Law, supra note 3, art. 81.  
64
  KEITH & LIN, supra note 1, at 161. 
65
  Id. 
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robbery is still ultimately punishable by death for all burglaries and bank 
robberies, attenuated use (or sales) of guns, any amount of money defined as 
“huge,” or if a court finds that an injury in the course of the robbery was 
“serious.”  Not only did the 1997 Criminal Law have little softening effect 
on punishing robbery, it reemphasized the government’s intent to impose 
harsh penalties in an attempt to deter the rising robbery rates.66 
B. Extensive Use of Capital Punishment Is Intended to Deter Crime 
Increasing use of the death penalty reflects a belief among policy 
makers that the most effective way to deter rising crime is to impose a 
severe penalty.67  Despite recent calls for reducing use of the death penalty, 
policy makers still believed in 1997 that the death penalty was an effective 
deterrent against serious crime.68  The Eighth National People’s Congress 
strongly endorsed the position that “death sentences for existing crimes 
should remain unchanged to act as a forceful deterrent against wrongdoers in 
the new [1997] law.”69  
The 1997 Criminal Law permits use of the death penalty for nearly 
three times as many crimes as in 1979, bringing the total number of crimes 
punishable by death to eighty-eight crimes, or nearly twenty-two percent of 
the criminal law.70  The 1997 Criminal Law reaffirmed much of the language 
in the 1979 Criminal Law permitting use of the death penalty.  Both Laws 
state that courts should use the death penalty only for the “extremely 
                                           
66
  TANNER, supra note 1, at 139. 
67
 TANNER, supra note 1;  BAKKEN, supra note 1, at 395-396; Marina Svensson, State Coercion, 
Deterrence, and the Death Penalty in the PRC, Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Association 
for Asian Studies, Chicago, IL (Mar. 22-25, 2001), at 2.  In addition to deterrence, officials have made 
utilitarian arguments that capital punishment will benefit society in a time of social change and instability.  
Deng Xiaoping, in response to the worsening social and economic conditions in the 1980s said that the 
“death penalty cannot be abolished, and some criminals must be sentenced to death.”  Zhiqiu Lin & Ronald 
Keith, The Changing Substantive Principles of Chinese Criminal Law, 13 CHINA INFORMATION 1, 101 
(1998).  Deng reaffirmed that the goal of using the death penalty was not only to punish the criminal but 
also to “educate” potential future criminals about the consequences of committing crime.  TANNER, supra 
note 1, at 136.  Guo Daohui, senior professor of law in China and close acquaintance of former premier 
Zhu Rongji, said with respect to the current crime wave that putting to death a number of convicted 
criminals, society can be cleaned of “trash,” which brings well-being to the general populace.  Ho, supra 
note 31, at 278.  Additionally, using the death penalty to assert state authority over the individual is a 
central feature of Chinese legal history.  Traditional authoritative attitudes are based on the deep-rooted 
belief in retribution for crimes and the belief that severe penal codes are the answer to social disorder.  Bin 
Liang, Hong Tu, Terance D. Miethe, & Lening Zhang, Sources of Variation in Pro-Death Penalty Attitudes 
in China, 46 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 119, 123 (2006). 
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  Lin & Keith, supra note 67, at 102. 
69
  Id.  
70
  CHEN, supra note 18, at 239 (noting that the 1979 Criminal Law provided for twenty-eight capital 
offenses and the 1997 Criminal incorporated an additional sixty offenses). 
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serious” crimes, but leaves that term undefined.71  The 1997 Criminal Law 
also adopts the two-year suspension of the death penalty if the court does not 
believe the execution is immediately necessary and the convicted criminal 
has an opportunity for reprieve.72 
According to official published statistics, China uses the death penalty 
more than every other country combined.73  The government classifies the 
actual use of the death penalty as a state secret, so information on how many 
death sentences courts impose and for what crimes is incomplete and 
unreliable.74  However, based on official statistics, use of the death penalty 
continued to rise throughout the 1990s.75  In 1990, official statistics showed 
that 960 people were sentenced to death.76  Death sentences peaked at 6100 
people in 1996.77  Since then, use of the death penalty has declined but has 
not dipped below 1990 levels.78  Amnesty International estimated that 3900 
people were sentenced to death in 2005 and that 1770 were executed.79  
Based on information from local officials and judges, however, Chinese 
legal experts estimate that in 2005 the number may actually be as high as 
8,000-10,000 executions.80  
Public support for the death penalty as a means to deter crime remains 
generally high.81  The Ministry of Public Security surveyed 15,000 people 
and found that the vast majority believed the state’s handling of criminals 
was adequate or “not tough enough.”82  Nearly sixty percent believed that 
the existing laws were “too lenient,” while only two percent found the law 
too strict.”83  A separate survey of over 5000 individuals found that less than 
one percent believed the death penalty should be abolished, and twenty-two 
                                           
71
  1997 Criminal Law, supra note 3, art. 48; 1979 Criminal Law, supra note 10, art. 43. 
72
  1997 Criminal Law, supra note 3, art. 48.  Under the two-year suspended death penalty, the 
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  Id. at 11. 
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Kill Carefully,” ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Mar. 31, 2006 available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/ 
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percent believed that it was not used frequently enough.84  Recognizing this 
public support, the government frequently publishes death sentences meted 
out to the most heinous criminals, frequently before major public holidays to 
celebrate the “triumph of the State in the battle against serious crimes.”85  
Such high public support for the death penalty could prove to be a barrier to 
reform unless government leaders articulate the practical pitfalls of the 
penalty structure for robbery. 
C. Provisions in the 1997 Criminal Law Encourage Reform and Critics 
Suggest Reforming Use of the Death Penalty 
In light of the high public support for the death penalty, do death 
penalty reforms stand any chance of success?  Among its most significant 
changes, the 1997 Law codified three principles commonly considered to be 
foundational principles of criminal law in liberal democracies.86  These 
principles will provide reformers with legal hooks on which to hang 
significant policy reforms.87 
First, the 1997 Criminal Law codified the principle of nulla crimen 
nulla poena sine lege (no crime or punishment without law).88  This 
principle prevents courts from arbitrarily creating crimes retroactively.  It 
also makes the criminal justice system more predictable in two ways: (1) it 
provides fair notice to individuals of the legal consequences of their actions, 
and (2) it allows policy makers to make better decisions because they know 
that their laws will not be undermined by unilaterally-created laws or 
punishments in any given court.89  
Second, the 1997 Criminal Law adopted the principle that the law will 
be applied equally to all individuals.90  This provision further improves 
predictability because it prevents individuals from evading the law based on 
high social or economic status and privilege.91  
                                           
84
  Svensson, supra note 67, at n. 10.  One independent survey of civilians, legal experts and officials 
found that the majority of respondents held an affirmative view of the death penalty “unreservedly” and 
regard it as essential for their country.  Ho, supra note 31, at 285.  Among peasants, who comprise the 
majority of China’s population, most believed that “since capital punishment has been a part of the Chinese 
penal system since time immemorial, its continuous existence is simply a matter of course.”  Id. at 281.  
The respondents who agreed with capital punishment expressed “absolute confidence” in the death penalty 
as an effective deterrent against crime, and as a way of safeguarding law-abiding citizens.  Id. 
85
  Ho, supra note 31; Svensson, supra note 67, at 14, 16. 
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  DRESSLER, supra note 47, at 41. 
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  KEITH & LIN, supra note 1, at 160.  
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  1997 Criminal Law, supra note 3, art. 3.  See also CHEN, supra note 18, at 236. 
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  DRESSLER, supra note 47, at 42.  
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  1997 Criminal Law, supra note 3, art. 4. 
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  LUO, supra note 19, at 9. 
MARCH 2007 RETHINKING CHINA’S STRATEGY FOR ROBBERY 537 
  
Third, Article Five states that the severity of the punishment shall be 
“equivalent” to the crime committed.92  Although the Law does not define 
“equivalent,” the provision helps counter a rise in “neo-traditional ‘heavy 
penalty-ism,’” which some thought harkened too closely to feudal criminal 
law.93  Further, the provision gives reformers a hook on which to hang 
arguments that the criminal law may in some cases, such as robbery, punish 
individuals too harshly.94  
On the punishment side, the 1997 Criminal Law made subtle changes 
that allow courts to apply punishments more selectively.  It increased the 
types of punishments available to courts.  These punishments include 
criminal detention, fines, and confiscation of property.95  In several 
provisions, the Law also varies the length of imprisonment by limiting 
prison time for certain crimes.96  The 1997 Criminal Law abolished the 
requirement that the execution be performed with a bullet to the back of the 
head,97 and the use of the death penalty for minors (under the age of 
eighteen) and pregnant women.98  
Besides the 1997 Criminal Law, legislators enacted major reforms 
related to the death penalty intending to ensure that courts apply it more 
uniformly.  These reforms will likely lower the overall number of state 
executions.99  In late 2006, the Standing Committee of the NPC passed 
legislation giving the Supreme People’s Court final review for all death 
penalty cases because leaders thought that provincial courts imposed the 
death penalty too widely and arbitrarily.100  Xiao Yang, President of the 
Supreme People’s Court, commented that the move was an “important 
procedural step to prevent wrongful convictions.”101   
This legislation is in line with calls for reform by critics of the death 
penalty.  Critics contend that expansion of the death penalty is contrary to 
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  1997 Criminal Law, supra note 3, art. 5. 
93
  KEITH & LIN, supra note 1, at 21.   
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  KEITH & LIN, supra note 1, at 160.  
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  1997 Criminal Law, supra note 3. 
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  Compare, e.g., 1979 Criminal Law, supra note 10, art. 151, with 1997 Criminal Law, supra note 
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  1979 Criminal Law, supra note 10, art. 45. 
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  Susan Jakes, China’s Message on the Death Penalty, TIME MAGAZINE, Nov. 3, 2006 available at 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1554379,00.html. 
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  China Makes Major Shift on Executions, N.Y. TIMES, November 1, 2006.  See also Decision of the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress Concerning Amendments to the Law of the 
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recent statements from party leaders to “kill fewer, kill less.”102  Responding 
to the 2006 legislation, Xiao Yang stated that “[i]n cases where the judge has 
legal leeway to decide whether to order death, he should always choose not 
to do so.”103  Those who oppose the 1997 Criminal Law’s expansion of 
capital crimes argue that the move “undermine[s] the Party policy of ‘not 
abolishing the death penalty, but limit[ing] its application.’”104  
Successful criminal law reforms in the past were based on gradual, 
piecemeal policy reforms grounded in pragmatism.105  Some scholars now 
advocate reform of the death penalty from a pragmatic perspective.  They 
believe the new legislation created more problems and failed to deter crime, 
which may be a subtle reference to the newly adopted principle that the 
punishment should fit the crime.106  Other scholars support abolition of the 
death penalty for non-violent crimes, specifically economic crimes like tax 
fraud and embezzlement.107  Ma Kechang, a Chinese professor of law, 
argues that extensive use of the death penalty may have actually contributed 
to the occurrence of more serious crime because authorizing capital 
punishment for so many crimes encourages criminals to commit the more 
serious crimes.108  Others claim that the deterrent rationale panders to the 
public’s taste for retribution against criminals, but does not necessarily deter 
crime.109  Instead, China should “reduce [its] overreliance on the death 
penalty by adopting as many other methods of punishment as possible to 
alleviate the problem of crime.”110  
In sum, the 1997 Criminal Law laid an important foundation for 
reform.  Even though it retains extensive use of the death penalty for 
robbery, lawmakers can argue from textual and pragmatic positions that the 
death penalty should be reformed for robbery.  Case studies further confirm 
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  Xingliang Chen, An Examination of the Death Penalty in China, 36-37 CONTEMPORARY CHINESE 
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 Jane McCartney, Innocent Man Who Made China Rethink Death Penalty, THE TIMES ONLINE, 
Nov. 20, 2006 available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-2461218,00.html. 
104
  Lin & Keith, supra note 67, at 101.  See also Bezlova, supra note 81. 
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that authorizing the death penalty for robbery may lead to greater social 
harm than intended, and that, in light of rising crime, the death penalty has 
not been an effective deterrent.  
III. STRIKE-HARD CAMPAIGNS DO NOT EFFECTIVELY DETER CRIME 
The Criminal Law authorizes capital punishment as a legal attempt to 
deter crime.  The policy-based attempt by law enforcement agencies to deter 
crime is through “strike-hard” campaigns.  However, these campaigns also 
fail to deter robbery and other serious crimes.  The government should 
reform these campaigns to improve deterrence. 
A. The Purpose of Strike-Hard Campaigns is to Enact Swift and Severe 
Punishment to Deter a Particular Crime 
The first strike-hard campaign occurred in 1983, but they have 
become a permanent fixture in the Chinese legal system.111  The central 
government initiates new campaigns periodically, which are then 
implemented by provincial and local authorities.  Nationwide campaigns 
were implemented in 1983-1987, 1990, and 1996.112  The campaigns are 
characterized by “mass arrests, swift and harsh sentencing, mass rallies, 
extensive propaganda work, and widespread use of the death penalty.”113  
Extensive media coverage about the arrests and sentencing focuses on death 
penalty cases and seeks to reinforce the strength of the state, educate people, 
and deter future individuals from committing the same crime.114 
The last national strike-hard campaign targeting robbery and other 
violent crimes occurred in 2001.115  But provincial campaigns targeted 
toward a particular type of robbery are a constant presence.116  In one local 
campaign, officials in two provinces recently encouraged police to shoot and 
kill bag snatchers on the spot and advocated imposing the death penalty if 
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  Svensson, supra note 67, at 3. 
112
  Murray Scott Tanner, Campaign-Style Policing in China and Its Critics, in CRIME, PUNISHMENT 
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the case went to trial.117  The recent “Iron Eagle” campaign focused law 
enforcement efforts on preventing robberies committed on public 
transportation, resulting in 3504 arrests in ten months.118  Trumpeting the 
success of the campaign before the National Holiday in October (when 
passenger rates on trains will rise), officials declared that trains were 
“basically clear of robbery.”119  Without providing statistics, and considering 
the economic motives for making such a statement, the government may 
have intended the announcement to pander to nationalistic sentiment rather 
than to accurately describe reduction of train robberies. 
The purpose of the strike-hard campaigns is to impose swift and 
severe punishment to deter crime over the long run and to reinforce the 
authority of the state.120  The deterrence rationale holds—“rather 
simplistically”—that a severe penalty will deter individuals from committing 
crime.121  When the first strike-hard campaign was launched in 1983, Deng 
Xiaoping stated, “only by being severe can we cure crime for good.”122 
The majority of death sentences handed down during the campaigns 
are for robbery, murder, and robbery-murder cases.123  During strike-hard 
campaigns, “courts may and should lean towards the heavier punishment 
within the range of punishment for a particular crime that is prescribed by 
law.” 124  This creates a “tension between this policy orientation and the third 
general principle of the criminal law, which would require the court to 
attempt to individualize the punishment in accordance with the 
circumstances of the offender.”125 
B. The Strike-Hard Campaigns are an Ineffective Deterrent to Crime and 
Create Unintended Problems for Law Enforcement Officials 
The two main criticisms of the strike-hard campaigns are that they fail 
to deter crime and waste law enforcement resources.  The two largest spikes 
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available at http://news.oneindia.in/2006/04/06/china-police-urged-to-shoot-arm-hacking-bag-snatchers-
1144298101.html. 
118
  Thousands Arrested in China for Railway, Robbery, Theft, WORLD NEWS CONNECTION, Oct. 11, 
2006, at 1, available at DIALOG, File No. 985. 
119
  Id. 
120
  Bakken, supra note 82, at 14. 
121
  Tanner, supra note 112, at 173 (noting that the Shanghai Public Security Bureau Chief 
emphasized during the 1996 campaign that severity of punishment “is the most fundamental special 
characteristic” of strike-hard campaigns). 
122
  Bakken, supra note 82, at 14.  See also CHEN, supra note 18, at 240. 
123
  Svensson, supra note 67, at 3. 
124
  CHEN, supra note 18, at 240. 
125
 Id. 
MARCH 2007 RETHINKING CHINA’S STRATEGY FOR ROBBERY 541 
  
in crime between 1981 and 2001 occurred shortly after two major national 
campaigns.126  Analyzing data from the failure of the first campaign from 
1983 to 1987, Chinese scholars predicted that the 1996 national campaign 
would also fail, which it did.127  Another scholar noted that the investment in 
“sheer putativeness” in strike-hard campaigns is a “futile strategy” to deter 
crime; rather, the Party uses it to appear tough on crime and shore-up its 
legitimacy.128 
The strike-hard campaigns waste police resources and prevent police 
from implementing tactics that contribute to crime prevention.  One scholar 
interviewing a local official described the wasted resources:  
“[The local police] are under terrific pressure from above to 
show statistical results, in particular an increase in the number 
of arrests and the percentage of all formally opened cases that 
are ‘cracked.’  Personnel and energy end up being focused 
almost exclusively on ‘investigation, attacks, and arrests.’  
Preventative social order management activities—such as 
patrolling, household registration, strengthening neighborhood 
resident groups, and management of guns, explosives, and other 
dangerous materials—all slip by the wayside, with the 
consequences for crime that are only likely to be felt after the 
campaign has ended.”129 
In addition, strike-hard campaigns have become too routine, undermining 
their deterrent purposes by making the campaigns easier to predict.  
Consequently, police morale and credibility are lowered.130  One Anhui 
police officer described the five campaigns implemented by the police 
station in 1994, saying, “month after month we have unified operations, day 
after day there are ‘specialized struggles.’  There are 365 days in a year, and 
every one of them is supposedly the ‘key link.’”131  Campaigns are often 
instigated at the same time, and many experienced and often more dangerous 
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criminals are able to recognize the patterns and lay low to avoid detection.132  
Consequently, public officials usually will arrest “superficial” offenders to 
meet arrest quotas.133  In itself, this is an intrinsic failure of the campaigns. 
In sum, not only do the campaigns fail to deter crime, but they also 
cause more harm by creating the impression that crime is widespread and 
enforcement is weak.  With crime rates rising, it is a good time for 
lawmakers to consider reforming the ineffective campaigns.  
IV. CHINA’S LAWMAKERS SHOULD ADOPT NOVEL DETERRENCE THEORIES 
TO IMPROVE DETERRENCE OF ROBBERY  
The confluence of law, economics, sociology, and psychology 
introduces fresh solutions to longstanding problems in criminal law, 
including deterrence strategies.  Interdisciplinary scholarship has flourished 
in the United States,134 and China is in a particularly ripe position to adopt 
reforms to its criminal law based on an interdisciplinary strategy.  Although 
criminal law reform in China has been sporadic,135 casting reforms as 
gradual shifts based on pragmatic solutions are more likely to gain traction 
with the public and help alleviate fear of being soft on crime.136  Deng 
Xiaoping’s famous aphorism describing the virtues of pragmatism—that 
“regardless of the color of the cat, as long as it catches mice it’s a good 
cat”—provides an effective foundation for pragmatic arguments in modern 
China.137  China should recognize advancements in deterrence strategy and, 
absent endogenous reasons why the same social and psychological effects 
would not occur in China, reform its criminal law and strike-hard campaigns 
to improve deterrence of robbery. 
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A. China Should Reform Strike-Hard Campaigns in Favor of Order-
Maintenance Policing Based on “Social Influence” Effects 
The first policy recommendation is to recognize the impact of “social 
influence” and abolish the strike-hard campaigns in favor of directing 
resources toward order-maintenance policing strategies.  Social influence 
theory holds that the perception of widespread criminal activity induces 
potential criminals to commit crimes.138  By “advertising” the widespread 
commission of a particular crime, the strike-hard campaigns inadvertently 
signal to potential criminals that enforcement of that crime is weak. 
Empirical studies have shown that social influence is pervasive in the 
social, economic, and political life of a community.  Social psychologists 
describe the phenomenon of “social influence” as “the propensity of 
individuals to conform to the behavior expectation of others.”139  Diners, for 
example, prefer to eat at restaurants that they perceive to be popular with 
other diners.140  Voters will often vote for political candidates whom they 
believe or know are popular among other voters.141  Teenage girls are more 
likely to become pregnant when they perceive that other teenage girls have 
become pregnant too.142   
In criminal law, social influence theory holds that individuals are 
more likely to commit crimes when they perceive that criminal activity is 
widespread, which is the same effect as the non-criminal examples above.143  
Several empirical studies confirm that this phenomenon exists in criminal 
decision-making.  People are more likely to cheat on their taxes when they 
think other people are cheating on their taxes.144  Neighborhood crime rates 
have shown geographical variance in crime rates with more accuracy than 
individual criminal records, demographics, and law enforcement tactics.145  
People arrested for looting and rioting tend to have no prior criminal record, 
indicating that the acts of others heavily influence them.146  
One experiment tested the influence of social norms on the decision to 
vandalize an abandoned car.147  A car was placed in the middle of Stanford 
University campus where it remained in pristine condition for over a week.  
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The researcher then smashed the windshield with a sledgehammer, at which 
point passersby spontaneously joined in the destruction to further vandalize 
the car and strip it of valuable parts.  The researcher concluded that the sight 
of others openly vandalizing the car “released passersby from their 
inhibitions against vandalism and theft.”148  When individuals perceived that 
others were profiting from crime, they joined in.  Why?  
The reason that the perception of widespread crime influences others 
to commit crime is because of criminal law’s “signaling effect.”149  
Individuals are likely to infer that when criminal activity is widespread, 
enforcement must be weak and therefore the risk of being caught is low and 
the potential rewards high.150  The signaling effects are likely to be 
exceptionally potent for economic crimes such as robbery because 
individuals perceive that others have found a way to make a profit without 
paying the price of being caught.  Consequently, criminal law policies that 
“create the impression that crime is widespread can actually increase law 
breaking, even if that policy efficiently maintains or even raises the expected 
penalty for crime.”151  
The connection to China’s strike-hard campaigns targeting robbery is 
unmistakable.  The theory predicts that even when authorities raise the 
expected penalty for robbery during the strike-hard campaigns, the 
impression that robbery is widespread implies that criminals have avoided 
capture for committing a crime and have thereby benefited from its 
commission.  In turn, this leads to increased lawbreaking by other criminals 
after the strike-hard campaign.   
Indeed, China’s robbery rates have grown exponentially in spite of the 
strike-hard campaigns since 1983.  In fact, the two largest spikes in crime 
occurred after the strike-hard campaigns occurred.152  Like the vandalized 
car at Stanford, widespread awareness that others are committing a particular 
crime creates a permissive environment to commit the crime, regardless of 
the severity of the penalty.  The campaigns signal to potential criminals that 
robbery is a profitable crime once the campaign has concluded and 
authorities look the other way.   
On the one hand, China’s leaders should not ignore the increase in 
robberies by sweeping them under the rug.  On the other hand, they should 
not rely on a dramatic show of force through massive campaigns to deter 
                                           
148
 Id. at 356. 
149
  Id. 
150
 Id. 
151
  Kahan, supra note 14, at 2487. 
152
  See discussion supra Part III.B. 
MARCH 2007 RETHINKING CHINA’S STRATEGY FOR ROBBERY 545 
  
crime.  Rather, authorities should redirect their strike-hard campaign 
resources into other more effective means of deterrence.  
One possible solution is order-maintenance policing, which social 
influence explains will better deter robbery.  Order-maintenance policing, 
also known as the “broken windows” theory, holds that the prevalence of 
misdemeanor offenses in a community, such as panhandling, loitering, 
public drunkenness, and petty drug dealing, lead to a serious crime problem 
because of the effects of social influence.153  The prevalence of disorder 
implies that the community tolerates disorder and is therefore more likely to 
tolerate crime.  Otherwise stated, “[i]f a window in a building is broken and 
is left unrepaired, all the rest of the windows will soon be broken . . . .  
[O]ne unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so 
breaking more windows costs nothing.”154   
The primary indicator that crime is “tolerated or expected” in a 
community is the incidence of petty criminal activity and public disorder, 
such as unrepaired broken windows:155  
“The unchecked panhandler is, in effect, the first broken 
window.  Muggers and robbers . . . believe they reduce their 
chances of being caught or even identified if they operate on 
streets where potential victims are already intimidated by 
prevailing conditions.  If the neighborhood cannot keep a 
bothersome panhandler from annoying passersby, the thief may 
reason, it is even less likely to call the police to identify a 
potential mugger or to interfere if the mugging actually takes 
place.”156 
The policy response is thus to direct law enforcement initiatives toward 
preventing minor crime before it creates a permissive environment to foster 
more serious crime.157 
New York City used order-maintenance policing widely throughout 
the 1990s.158  New York’s implementation of the “broken windows” strategy 
focused on aggressive pursuit of misdemeanor crimes and public-order 
offenses.159  During that time, the robbery rate dropped by thirty percent, and 
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the burglary rate dropped twenty-five percent.160  But the effect was not the 
same for all crimes.  One study shows that while the effect on other crimes is 
low, a ten percent increase in misdemeanor arrests in New York decreased 
robbery by approximately three percent.161  Even before New York adopted 
the “broken windows” strategy, studies showed a strong correlation between 
higher robbery rates and disorder across forty neighborhoods in the United 
States.162  
Catching lawbreakers for minor crimes also turned out to have an 
unexpected effect on reducing more serious crime.163  In many cases, the 
criminals jumping turnstiles in the subway or committing petty theft on the 
street corner turned out to be the same individuals who had already 
committed more serious offenses, or were more likely to commit serious 
offenses in the future.164 
Now is an opportune time for China to implement order-maintenance 
policing strategies.165  Public disorder of the type described above is 
prevalent in many urban neighborhoods.  Officials recently stated that 
“public order disturbances” in China’s urban areas rose 6.6 percent between 
2004 and 2005.166  Order-maintenance policing is not inherently applicable 
only in the United States, and it will not be difficult for China’s leaders to 
link order-maintenance policing with rhetorical statements they have already 
made about improving public order.167  Moreover, correcting policies for 
social influence effects and implementing order-maintenance strategies are 
fit for localization.  The policies encourage China to weave into its 
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deterrence strategy endogenous social norms, conditions, history, and culture 
instead of simply cross applying a U.S.-focused criminal law policy.168  In 
terms of cost, China already allocates massive law enforcement resources for 
the strike-hard campaigns.  Order-maintenance policing is much cheaper 
than imprisoning more criminals.169  But until China recognizes the effects 
of social influence, the arguments for reforming the strike-hard campaigns in 
favor of order-maintenance policing will be less persuasive.   
B. China Should Discontinue Using the Death Penalty for Robbery 
Based on “Marginal Deterrence” Effects 
China should recognize the effects of “marginal deterrence” and the 
concept of “substitution effects” and abolish the use of the death penalty for 
robbery.  This will provide a deterrent to committing murder during the 
robbery, and it will discourage the commission of robbery and robbery-
related crimes. 
Marginal deterrence theory holds that imposing the same penalty for 
two unequal crimes provides an incentive for a criminal to commit the more 
dangerous crime.170  As George Stigler explained in his famous essay on 
marginal deterrence, “[i]f the thief has his hand cut off for taking five 
dollars, he had just as well take $5,000.”171  By imposing the death penalty 
for two related but unequal crimes, such as robbery and murder,172 China 
inadvertently provides an incentive for those who commit robbery to further 
commit murder because the criminal’s chances of escape or identification 
increase by killing witnesses.173  But the price that the criminal must pay is 
the same whether he commits robbery or murder.  
Thus, there was little incentive for the four migrants from Beijing, the 
prostitute and the boss, and the robber in Sichuan to refrain from killing their 
victims.174  If the penalty for robbery had been ten to twenty years in prison, 
                                           
168
  See Peerenboom, supra note 16, at 231 (noting failure of policies that are simply cross applied 
from the United States). 
169
  Kahan, supra note 134, at 373. 
170
 Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2389-2390.  Cesare Beccaria 
and Jeremy Bentham were the first to recognize the effects of marginal deterrence.  Beccaria argued that 
“[i]f an equal punishment is laid down for two crimes which damage society unequally, men will not have a 
stronger deterrent against committing the greater crime if they find it more advantageous to do so.”  Id. at 
2390.  Bentham added that the goal of a criminal penalty is “to induce a man to choose always the least 
mischievous of two offences; therefore where two offenses come in competition, the punishment for the 
greater offence must be sufficient to induce a man to prefer the less.”  Id. 
171
  George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of the Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527 (1970). 
172
  Homicide is subject to the death penalty in China.  1997 Criminal Law, supra note 3, art. 232. 
173
  Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law As a Preference-Shaping 
Policy, 1990 DUKE L. J. 1, 14 (1990). 
174
  See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
548 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 16 NO. 2 
 
 
but murder was punishable by death, perhaps they would have thought twice 
about killing their victims.  
Substitution effects, an economic theory used to describe how 
consumers respond to price changes, explains another unintended 
consequence of imposing the death penalty on robbery.  One result of a high 
penalty on a particular crime is that there may be an increase in criminal 
activity after the core crime has been committed.175  In economics, the 
concept of substitution effects holds that at high costs, consumers will 
substitute one product altogether in favor of another.176  In criminal law, 
substitution effects holds criminals may substitute one crime for another 
crime when facing high penalties.177  The assumption is that individuals do 
not view the costs and benefits of a particular crime in a vacuum, but rather 
examine crimes in light of the costs and benefits of committing other 
crimes.178   
The robber who is not deterred by the high penalty of death will likely 
find the cost of committing other crimes during the robbery to be negligible.  
The individual may therefore first commit the robbery, then kill the victim, 
assault two witnesses, and perhaps assault, rob, or kill others.179  At the high 
price of robbery, the criminal is essentially substituting the commission of 
robbery for the commission of other crimes along the way, and consequently 
causing more harm to society.  If the penalty for committing robbery is 
lower, the individual could still commit the robbery, but may forego 
commission of the other crimes because the marginal cost of committing 
additional crimes is much higher.180  In the 2005 Jiangxi Province robbery-
murder case,181 the two individuals who did not want to kill the victims of 
the robbery would have at least had a legal rationale to attempt to prevent 
the killing if the penalty had been lower. 
While there is no official data on the increase or decrease of crime 
sprees in China, the general rise in crime and the fact patterns in cases 
suggest that China failed to deter additional crime after the robbery because 
the cost of additional crime to the criminal was negligible.  The “three 
robberies and you’re out” interpretation of the Criminal Law by the Supreme 
People’s Court has similar unintended consequences.182  The interpretation 
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may deter the reformed criminal from committing the third robbery, but if 
the individual commits the third robbery it will likely cause more social 
harm than if the penalty were kept the same as it was for the other two 
robberies.183 
Abolishing the death penalty for robbery may not appear to deter 
robbery initially because the penalty is lower, but over the long run it should 
deter more potential robbers.  The reason is because the price of escape—
killing witnesses—will have been raised compared the price of committing a 
robbery.  An individual will be less likely to commit a robbery in the first 
place if the cost of escape is much higher.  However, even if the robbery is 
committed, the incentive not to commit murder after the robbery is higher, 
which reduces harm to society.  Combined with the “broken windows” 
policing strategy discussed above, the result should be more effective 
deterrence for robbery and robbery-murder. 
High public support for the death penalty in China means the death 
penalty will probably remain for some crimes.  However, the government 
has enacted incremental changes and revisions to the death penalty, and the 
legal hooks for arguing that the punishment does not fit the crime are in 
place.184  Asking the government to argue from a moral standpoint is 
unlikely to succeed, at least in the short-run.  But once China's leaders 
recognize the significance of marginal deterrence effects, abolishing the 
death penalty for robbery becomes a gradual and pragmatically justifiable 
policy.  Pragmatic arguments have carried the day in China,185 and will 
perhaps have a greater impact on popular understanding and willingness to 
reform. 
V. CONCLUSION 
China has failed to deter robbery since embarking on economic 
reforms in the early 1980s.  The government pursued a two-pronged strategy 
to deter crime:  China’s Criminal Law stipulates that robbery will receive the 
death penalty in most cases, and the government has implemented strike-
hard campaigns to exert swift and severe penalties on robbers.  However, 
both of these strategies have failed.  
Instead of maintaining an ineffective deterrence strategy, China should 
reform its Criminal Law and strike-hard campaigns in an effort to better 
deter robbery.  First, China ignores the effect of social influence on the 
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decisions of criminals to commit crimes.  China should recognize these 
effects and should reform or abolish its use of the strike-hard campaigns in 
favor of order-maintenance policing.  Second, Chinese lawmakers disregard 
the effects of marginal deterrence and substitution effects.  The severe 
penalty for robbery may be responsible for the amount of robberies and 
murders committed.  Abolishing the death penalty for robbery may lower the 
rates of both of these crimes.  
Successful reforms in China will not come overnight.  Public support 
for criminal law reform is generally low, because most citizens view reform 
as softening the system rather than strengthening it.186  Policy changes 
require a long-term shift in the way that China conceives of and practices 
criminal justice.  As such, immediate results should not be expected as 
changes in the law “trickle down” to street-level criminals.187  Successful 
reforms to China’s criminal law have been inconsistent.188  But gradual shifts 
in policy couched in pragmatic terms are likely to gain public support and 
alleviate fear of criminal law reform.189  
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